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242 PEOPLE v. EvANS [39 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5308. In Bank. July 9, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN W. EVANS, JR., 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Mis-
conduct of Prosecuting Attomey.-Misconduct of prosecuting 
attorney in asking leading questions without making any 
attempt to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein 
and apparently for the purpose of getting uncorroborated 
testimony before the jury is a possible ground for reversal, 
although objections were not made to all of such questions, 
where the case is one in which an admonition would not have 
purged the harmful effect of the remarks. 
[2] Indictment and Information-Charging Offense-Conformity 
to Preliminary Proceedings.-In view of the rule that an 
information may charge a different but related crime shown 
by the evidence taken before the magistrate bearing on the 
·transaction involved in the commitment order, an information 
charging lewd conduct with a child in violation of Pen. 
Code, § 288, as to which a commitment was ordered, may in-
clude the related offense of sex perversion in violation of 
Pen. Code, § 288a, although defendant was not bound over 
by the committing magistrate on•that charge. 
[3] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-In-
structions.-Any confusion or prejudice resulting from an 
awkwardly drawn instruction that "defendant in a criminal 
case is not required to prove his innocence, but is presumed 
to be innocent until the contrary is proven, and in case of ' 
a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal, and if the evidence can reason-
ably be accounted for upon a theory which would admit of 
a defendant's innocence, he should not be convicted," may 
not be ground for reversal where a further instruction states 
that "the effect of a presumption of innocence is only to place 
upon the State the burden of proving a defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt," ap.d where this is followed 
by the orthodox instruction on the meaning of "reasonable 
doubt." 
[4] !d.-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury-Affidavits of Jurors.-
Affidavits of jurors are inadmissible for purpose of impeach-
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Low, § 458; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 70. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Criminal Law, § 1404(8); [2] In-
dictment and Information, § 62; [3] Criminal Law, § 1419(8); 
[4] Criminal Law, § 961 (3); [5] Criminal Law, §§ 1404(1), (8); 
[7) Criminal Law,§ 1404(12). 
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ing verdict whether they show misconduct or evidence received 
out of court. 
[5a-5c] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Miscon-
duct of Prosecuting Attorney.-Where the case is one involv-
ing a crime of such inflammatory character as lewd conduct 
with a child and the only evidence as to identity of assailant 
is the child's testimony which, while not so inherently im-
pl·obable as to be worthy of no belief, describes her assailant 
with such exactitude as to raise a doubt whether or not she 
had been coached in her lines, improper and repetitious 
questions by the prosecuting attorney setting forth defendant's 
exact description, statements of police officers describing 
the crime put in the form of questions to defendant in an 
attempt to gain from him an admission, reference by prosecut-
ing attorney to a knife found on defendant's person but not 
'introduced in evidence, and other errors which helped tip 
the scales against defendant, constitute grounds for a reversal. 
[6] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-Repeated asking of questions relative 
to objectionable and prejudicial matter which involves appeals 
to the passions and prejudices of the jury constitutes revers-
ible error. 
[7] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-Statements of fact not in evidence 
by the prosecution in its argument to the jury constitute pre-
judicial misconduct. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Alameda 
County denying a new trial. Charles Wade Snook, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Prosecution for lewd conduct with a child. Order denying 
defendant a new trial, reversed. 
Popper & Burnstein, Fred B. Hart and Robert H. Kron-
inger for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and David K. Lener, Deputy 
Atto~ney General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant, John W. Evans, Jr., was con-
victed of a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code, and 
also of a violation of section 288a of the same code. The 
court granted a new trial on the 288a count, but denied de-
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fendant 's motion for a new trial on the 288 violation. A 
third count, charging assault with a deadly weapon was dis-
missed prior to trial. Judgment was suspended and defend-
ant was placed on probation on the condition that he serve 
a nine months' sentence in the county jail. After hearing, 
it was determined that the defendant was not a sexual psycho-
path. The appeal is from the order denying a new trial 
on the conviction under section 288 of the Penal Code. 
The principal contentions raised on this appeal are the 
insufficiency of the evidence so far as the element of identifica-
tion is concerned and prejudicial errors alleged to have oc-
curred during the course of the trial. 
It clearly appears from the record that the complaining 
witness, a female child of 10% years, was accosted and 
molested in an Oakland public park about 6 p. m. on a Sat-
urday evening (.August 12, 1950) as she was leaving a swim-
ming pool located there on her way home. .According to 
her testimony, the man who accosted her pulled her behind 
a hill, disarranged her clothing and put his fingers in, and 
on, her private parts. She also complained that he exhibited 
his own sexual organs and attempted to force her to com-
mit an unnatural act. She testified that he then, drew a knife, 
telling her that she was to walk · away and not look back or 
he would kill her. According to her story, the entire en-
counter took place in about five minutes. After leaving her 
assailant, the witness walked to a corner store where she 
first called the police who noted the time as 6:06 p. m. and 
then, a few minutes l~ter, called her mother. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT 
Three days after the commission of the crime, the com-
plaining witness was shown a picture of the defendant. This 
picture was on the top of a pile of pictures. She remembered 
having seen him some time prior to the day in question but 
was unable to remember where, or ~hen, she had seen him. 
She admitted that she could have seen him almost any place. 
An hour after having been shown the defendant's picture, 
she was taken to a room wliere the defendant was alone. She 
testified that at the time of the offense her assailant was 
wearing tan khaki pants with a zipper fly, a belt with the 
initial "W" on the buckle, and a yellow cable knit sweater 
with short sleeves. So far as the defendant's physical ap-
pearance was concerned, she testified that he was 5'11" tall, 
weighed 187 pounds, and was 21 years of age. On cross-
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examination she said he could not have been 5'10" tall, or 
6'0" tall, but was 5'11". (The defendant is 5'11" in height, 
21 years of age, and, at the time of arrest, weighed 185 
pounds.) The complaining witness testi£ed that the man 
who accosted her had "goo on his hair, you know, slicked 
down.'' The record shows that the defendant owned khaki 
pants with a button fly, a yellow T shirt, a plain tan belt 
with no initial on the buckle ; that he did not own, or have 
any reason to own, a buckle with the initial "W" thereon; 
that he did own a belt buclP.e with the initials "NMMI" 
(New Mexico Military IIl.!ltitute); that he wore no hair oil; 
nor did he own any. On the · day in question, the defendant 
was wearing, together with khaki trousers and a yellow T 
shirt, the plain, uninitialed, web belt. He testi£ed that the 
only time he wore the belt with the initials "NMMI" was 
when he was dressed up at school. The defendant testi£ed 
that the khaki trousers and yellow T shirt was a common 
manner of dress in the neighborhood: This is corroborated 
by two witnesses who testified that they had each seen a 
boy, not the defendant, similarly dressed, at the time of 
the crime, in that neighborhood, walking rapidly away from 
the park. These other boys were seen at about 6 :10 .and 
6:30p.m. 
Darlene Hatton, aged 15 years, testified that she had been 
swimming in the pool in the park in question, and that shortly 
before the time of the offense, the defendant had been out-
side the wire fence which enclosed the pool, a distance of 
approximately 16 feet, and had whistled at her. She testi-
fied that the man who whistled at her had slick, shiny hair 
"plastered" down, but she did 1;1ot testify as to how he was 
dressed. She thought that it was either Thursday or Friday 
of the week following the offense (which had taken place 
on a Saturday) that the woman who owned a candy conces-
sion at the park had shown her the picture of the defend-
ant and asked her if she had ever seen him before. .A few 
hours after seeing the one picture-that of defendant-she 
was taken to a police line-up where she identified the de-
fendant · as the man whose picture she had seen and who bad 
whistled at her the previous Saturday. She, too, testifiPd 
that she bad seen the defendant before the day in question 
"once or twice" at the Dimond Pool (the one here involved) 
but could not remember when she had seen him. 
Defendant's brother testified that he and defense counsel, 
walking together, met the complaining witness and her mother 
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in the courthouse just prior to the commencement of the 
trial and the attorney, pointing to defendant's brother, asked 
the child if she were still "sure that this is the man who 
did it," to which she replied that she was. At the trial the 
child denied having said so, but• the mother admitted that the 
question had been asked and answered by the child, but said 
that the witness, Robert Evans, was not in her line of vision. 
The complaining witness admitted having told the story 
to police officers and the prosecuting attorney about 10 times. 
In describing the attack on her she used the term ''private 
parts'' and explained that the police officers had told her 
to use it; at the preliminary hearing, she had used the words 
"penis" and "vulva" and said at the trial that she had 
learned the words in a book her mother had given her but 
she didn't remember how long before her mother had given 
her the book. 
DEFENDANT's ALmr 
Defendant's story, which was corroborated by his grand-
mother and brother, showed that he had worked around his 
home, a distance of about nine or ten blocks from the park, 
until approximately 5 :30 p. m. on that Saturday; that he 
then drove to the store for some groceries and there cashed 
a check; that he returned home at about 5 :55 p. m. and was 
at dinner until 6 :30 p. m. One of the employees of the gro-
cery store corroborated the defendant's story that the check 
was cashed on the Saturday in question but did not know 
at what time it had been done. Defendant testified that he 
had been in school in New Mexico up until the first of June, 
1950, and that he had remained at home from that time on. 
He testified that he had been in Dimond Park two or three 
times since his return from school; that he had not been 
there on the day in question; that be had been there within 
two or three weeks prior to .August 12th. 
PREJUDICIAL ERRORS AND MiscONDUCT OccURRING AT THE TRIAL 
Three days after the crime was committed, defendant, at 
the telephoned request of the police, went to the police sta-
tion. He testified that at the time of the call be bad been 
working on his radio with a small 2-inch pocket knife which 
he put in his pocket when he left home; that when he ar-
rived at the station, he remembered he had it with him and 
being afraid of having it found on his person since he did 
not know with what he was charged and having heard the 
officers mention a knife, he stuck it under the arch of his 
July 1952] PEOPLE v. EvANs 
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shoe with the open blade inserted in the heel. The knife 
was found there by the officers who searched him. It was 
later returned to him and was never put in evidence by the 
prosecution although a witness was called to testify to the 
incident and it was referred to as being of the same type 
and description as that carried by the man who attacked 
the complaining witness, although no evidence was offered 
either describing the knife carried by him or which would 
indicate that the one found on defendant's person was in 
any way connected with the attack. The knife was referred 
to in both the opening statement of the prosecution and in 
its closing argument as being the same type of knife car-
ried by the girl's attacker. The girl herself was unable to 
describe the knife. 
In addition to references to the knife, one of the witnesses, 
Dagneau, was questioned as follows: "Well now, at the time 
that the police officers received the information from you 
as to having seen this man at approximately 6 :05, or there-
abouts, they asked you whether or not he was about twenty 
years old, tall and very strong looking ; brown hair, brown 
eyes, dark hair on his forearms, freckles on his face, brown 
shoes, sun tan pants and a yellow shirt, age about 20 or 21, 
height about five feet eleven, weight 185.'' This was the 
exact description of the defendant who was sitting in the 
courtroom. There had been no direct evidence as to the 
freckles, dark hair OJ;l the forearms, color of the eyes, etc. 
The witness was then asked if this was the description of 
the man the police were seeking, to which he answered "Yes." 
The entire description was repeated a few questions later, 
and could only have had the effect of informing the jury 
that the police ~ere looking for the defendant, and not for 
the girl's attacker, at the time they questioned the witness, 
Dagneau. The witness later testified that defendant was not 
the man he had seen running from the park although the 
man he had seen was wearing a yellow shirt of some type. 
Several instances appear in the record where the prosecu-
tion asked leading questions apparently for the purpose of 
getting uncorroborated testimony before the jury. For ex-
ample, the defendant, upon being questioned by the police, 
had refused to talk until after he had consulted with his 
father. Much stress is placed on defendant's refusal to talk 
until he had seen his father and one of the officers testified 
that when defendant was asked to confess the crime he had 
replied that "his father had always told him never to admit 
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anything.'' On cross-examination, the prosecutor was per-
mitted to ask defendant, over objection, "Do you remember 
that in that same conversation with Genevesino and Brown 
(police officers) Genevesino said, 'John, that little girl that 
pointed you out last night and said you were in Dimond 
Park last Saturday August the 12th around six p. m. and forced 
her head down and made her do something to you, had you 
seen her prior to that Saturday!' And at that time, you 
said, 'Yes, once before, I think.' Now, didn't he ask you 
that question and didn't you give that answer Y'' The de-
fendant's answer was that he did not remember any such 
conversation. Another example of such questioning by the 
prosecution was one asked of the defendant, ''. . . did you 
tell Officer Brown in response to his request that you would 
tell him the truth about where it occurred on August 12th 
in the Dimond Park Y Did you say that you did not want 
to ·tell the truth of what happened until you had talked with 
your father because your father had told you never to admit 
anything Y '' Defenda.Ii.t denied having made any such state-
ment ap.d said that he had already told the officers the truth 
''about fifty other times too.'' Another question during de-
fendant's cross-examination was, "Well, did they (the offi-
cers) mention the fact that the little girl wh.om you had, seen 
had said that you had a knife when you accosted her in the 
Dimond Park," to which defendant replied that they "might 
have." 
Endeavors were also made to elicit ' a statement from the 
defendant's brother that defense counsel had engaged him 
in an attempt to "trick" the complaining witness into identi-
fying him as the defendant. When defense counsel objected, 
the court ruled it was proper cross-examination even though 
the witness twice answered that defense coUnsel had not so 
acted. 
[1] In none of the instances above quoted did the prose-
cution make any attempt to prove the truth of the matters 
asserted in the questions. It seems apparent that the only 
purpose of the ·form of the questions was to get the state-
ments before the jury. Although objections were not made 
to all of these questions, it would appear that the case was 
one in which an admonition would not have purged the 
harmful effect of the remarks. In cases where the mis-
conduct is of such a character that it cannot be purged of 
its harmful effect by an admonition, it will be considered 
as a possible ground for reversal where no objection was 
July 1952] PEOPLE v. EvANs 
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made or admonition requested on behalf of the accused (Peo-
ple v. Wynn, 44 Cal.App.2d 723 [112 P.2d 979]; People v. 
Podwys, 6 Cal.App.2d 71 [44 P.2d 377]; People v. Stafford, 
108 Cal.App. 26 [290 P. 920]; People v. George, 72 Cal. 
App. 124 [236 P. 934]). 
THE INFORMATION 
[2] The complaint against defendant charged only a vio-
lation of section 288 of the Penal Code, and he was bound 
over by the committing magistrate only upon that charge. 
The information, however, contained additional counts charg-
ing a violation of section 288a of the Penal Code and assault 
with a deadly weapon. Defendant contends that the court 
was without jurisdiction to try him on the 288a count and 
that reading the information to the jury must have had a 
highly inflammatory effect and amounted to prejudicial error. 
He also · contends that because of the inclusion of the viola-
tion of section 288a in the information it is void. This mat-
ter was recently considered by this court in Parks v. Superior 
Court, 38 Cal.2d 609, 612 [241 P.2d 521], wherein it was 
said: "In the decisions which outline the duties of the dis-
trict attorney pursuant to the foregoing provisions of the la:w 
[Cal. Const., art. I, § 8, and of the Pen. Code, § 739] there 
has been no departure from the proposition that the Consti-
tution protects a person from prosecution in the absence of 
a prior determination by either a magistrate or a grand jury 
that such action is justified. The legislative history and 
various claimed grounds of unconstitutionality of the pro-
visions of former section 809 (now 739) were rather ex-
tensively treated in People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632 [300 P. 23]. 
The effect of the court's declarations of the constitutional 
operation of the section was to approve the :filing of an in-
formation charging a different but related crime shown by 
the evidence taken before the magistrate bearing on the trans-
action involved in the commitment order. The court stated 
or plainly implied (212 Cal. at pp. 643-645) that an informa-
tion would be contrary to the Constitution if it designated 
a crime or crimes unrelated to or unconnected with the trans-
action which was the basis for the commitment order." The 
Parks case is controlling here inasmuch as the story told by 
the complaining witness shows that the two crimes were re-
lated to and connected with the transaction which was the 
basis for· the commitment order. 
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INSTRUCTION oN ''REAsoNABLE DoUBT'' 
[3] The defendant complains of the following instruction: 
''The defendant in a criminal case is not required to prove 
his innocence, but is presumed to be innocent until the con-
trary is proven, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, 
and if the evidence can reasonably be accounted for upon 
a theory which would admit of a ·defendant's innocence, he 
should not be convicted." There can be no question but 
that this instruction is inartistically and awkwardly drawn 
and, in the absence of any other instruction on the subject, 
it would be difficult to tell what its confusing or prejudicial 
effect would be. In the instant ·case, however, following the 
above quoted instruction, the court told the jury that : "The 
effect of a presumption of innocence is only to place upon 
the State the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'' This was followed by the orthodox 
instruction on the meaning of "reasonable doubt." 
JURORS l AFFIDAVITS 
[4] Two jurors produced affidavits that one of the jury, 
other than themselves, had taken a map of the city of Oak-
land in the jury room during the discussion of the jury. 
This map had not been received in evidence during the trial. 
The defendant contends that it was error to deny his motion 
for a new trial based on this evidence. The court refused 
to admit the affidavits in evidence, but ordered th.em filed. 
Defendant maintains that the rule declaring affidavits of 
jurors incompetent does not apply where they are used to 
show that the jury has received evidence out of court (other 
than a view of the premises) and that this is mentioned as 
a separate ground for granting a new trial in subdivision 
2 of section 1181 of the Penal Code. 
There is no merit in this contention since the affidavits are 
introduced to impeach the verdict of the jury whether they 
show misconduct or evidence received out of court. In Peo-
ple v. Gidney, 10 ·cal.2d 138, 146 [73 P.2d 1186], it was 
expressly held that affidavits of jurors showing misconduct 
out of court ''or evidence received by them from outside 
sources'' have been refused admission. 
[5a] This case presents an extremely close question as to 
the identity of the defendant. The child's testimony de-
scribing her assailant with such exactitude raises a doubt 
as to whether or not she had been coached in her lines. 
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When this "suspect" testimony is considered with the im-
proper line of questioning on the part of the prosecution it 
may very well have led the jury to its conclusion that the 
defendant was guilty. Several times during the trial, the 
jury heard the prosecution describe the precise appearance 
of the defendant as he sat in the courtroom; it heard the 
words of police officers describing a particularly vile crime 
put in the form of questions to defendant in an attempt to 
gain from him an admission. The repetitious questions set-
ting forth defendant's exact description could have had no 
other effect upon the jurors than to impress indelibly upon 
their minds the fact that the police had been looking for the 
defendant, not the unknown and unidentified man who mo-
lested the complaining witness. The statements made, in the 
guise of questions directed to defendant, in an effort to gain 
from him an admission could only have had one result, 
namely, that the jury would believe defendant had admitted 
the crime to the officers and was, on the trial, denying the 
truth of what he had previously said. 
[6] The repeated asking of questions relative to objection-
able and prejudicial matter which involved appeals to the 
passions and prejudices of the jury has been held to con-
stitute reversible error. (People v. Freitas, 34 Cal.A.pp.2d 684 
[94 P.2d 397] ; People v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.A.pp.2d 823 [111 
P.2d 659]; People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.App.2d 723 [112 P.2d 
9?9]; People v. Lynch, 60 Cal.A.pp.2d 133 [140 P.2d 418]; 
People v. Williarn.s, 104 Cal.A.pp.2d 323 [231 P.2d 544] .) 
[5b] The same thi:qg is true with respect to the references 
to the knife made by the prosecution. The knife found on 
defendant's person by the police was not in evidence and the 
complaining witness had been unable to describe the knife 
used by her assailant, yet the district attorney referred to 
defendant's knife as being the same type of knife carried 
by the girl's attacker. [7] Statements of facts not in evidence 
by the prosecution in its argument to the jury has been held 
to constitute prejudicial misconduct. (People v. Ford, 89 Cal. 
A.pp.2d 467 [200 P.2d 867] ; People v. Westcott, 86 Cal.A.pp. 
298 [260 P. 901]; People v. Henderson, 4 Cal.2d 188 [48 
P.2d 17]; People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334 [83 P. 43].) 
In a case such as this where the crime charged is of 
itself sufficient to inflame the mind of the average person, it 
is required that there be rigorous insistence upon observance 
of the rules of the admission of evidence and conduct of the 
trial. (People v. Adarn.s, 14 Cal.2d 154, 167 [93 P.2d 146] ; • 
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People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 888 [129 P .2d 367] ; 
People v. Byrd, 88 Cal.App.2d 188, 190 [198 P.2d 561] ). 
It appears to us that even more care should be taken to pro-
tect the rights of the accused where the evidence as to the 
identity of the defendant leads one to conclude that a child 
of the age of . the complaining witness, under the circum-
stance prevailing, would not have been able to describe her 
attacker so precisely. As was said in People v. Adams, supra: 
"Errors committed either by the prosecution or by the court 
in the course of a trial, which ordinarily might be considered 
trivial and as of no material consequence from a standpoint 
of adverse effect upon the rights of a defendant, may become 
of great importance when committed in a case of the char-
acter here involved." 
[5c] The only evidence presented as to the identity of 
the girl's assailant is the testimony of the complaining wit-
ness. While her testimony is not so inherently improbable 
as to be worthy of no belief, it is open to attack on the 
ground that it shows that she had been suggestively ques-
tioned and re-questioned as to the crime by the police. In 
connection therewith, it can hardly be said to be in accord 
with principles of justice and fair play to show a complain-
ing witness the picture of one man and then take her into 
a room where that man is the only occupant. 
It must be concluded that where, as here, the case is one 
involving a crime of such an inflammatory character and 
the evidence on the issue of identity so closely balanced, the 
errors set forth could not have had any other effect upon 
the jury than to tip the scales against the accused. 
The order denying a new trial is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
7, 1952. 
